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>CIAUST COMMITTEE FOR A RIGHTEOUS PEACE 

{Paix du Droit) 



THE FRENCH 

SOCIALIST PARTY 

AND WA R A I M S 

Replies to the Questiormaire 



NEW YORK 

GEORGE H. DORAN COMPANY 

MCMXVIII 



Price Jive emits 



THE FRENCH 

SOCIALIST PARTY 

AND WAR AIMS 

Replies to the Questionnaire 



NEW YORK 
GEORGE H. DORAN COMPANY 
MCMXVIII 



rpsr 



By Tr*iTi«fAr 



THE "QUESTIONNAIRE." 

1. — Conditions of peace. 

A. General bases of peace; the right of nations 
to dispose of themselves; self-government of nation- 
alities; annexations; war indemnities; restitution. 

B. Application of principles to concrete cases: 

(1) Belgium; Serbia; other Balkan countries; 
Poland; Finland; Alsace-Lorraine; North 
Schleswig; Armenia; 

(2) Lithuania; the Ukraine; the Czechs; the 
Jews; 

(S) Colonies. 

2. — Fundamental principles of international re- 
lations. 

A. International law; international order; in- 
ternational arbitration tribunals; league to enforce 
jjeace; penalties; coercive measures; 

B. Disarmament and the freedom of the seas; 

C. Means of satisfying the demands for justi- 
fiable economic expansion without territorial expan- 
sion. {The internationalisation of international 
lines of transport, straits, canals, chief railways, 
etc.) 

D. Abolition of secret diplomacy. 



VI FRENCH SOCIALIST PARTY AND WAR AIMS 

3. — Means of realising these aims in practice: 

A. How far should these questions be discussed 
at peace negotiations? 

B. Should commissions of enquiry he appointed 
to suggest solutions of certain questions? 

4. — The part to be played by the Internationale 
and Democracy. 

A. Co-operation of neutrals in the promotion of 
peace. 

B. Direct collaboration of Parliaments. 

C. Collaboration of the Socialist parties. 

D. Steps to he taken by the Internationale to 
exercise a continuous influence during early ne- 
gotiations and during the sittings of official confer- 
ences entrusted with the discussion of peace terms. 

5. — General Sociahst Conference. 

Are we prepared to take part in a gen£ral con- 
ference — 

(1) Without making conditions? 

(2) If not, on what conditions? 

(a) Statement of the attitude of the Socialist 
parties during the war; the question of responsi- 
bility; 

{by Majorities and minorities. 



THE FRENCH SOCIALIST 
PARTY AND WAR AIMS 

Geneeal Remakks. 

Any question relating to peace conditions 
assumes significance only when we have first 
decided in what spirit we seek to answer it. 

If we make it our aim to set forth what in 
our view is the best geographical policy and 
the best international system possible in the 
present capitalist world, we shall have a 
basis for discussion, and there will be no dif- 
ferences of opinion except as regards sec- 
ondary matters, which need not give rise to 
division among Socialists. 

But if, on the other hand, we desire to as- 
sume a peace based on compromise, and to 
decide what lessening of our hopes we should 
or should not agree to, then the answers 
would be yery various, and it would be diffi- 
cult to come to an understanding. To reach 

1 



2 FRENCH SOCIALIST PARTY AND WAR AIMS 

an agreement, it would first of all be neces- 
sary to state precisely the military, economic 
and financial position of the belligerents at 
the time of the peace pourparlers, and the 
answers would naturally differ according to 
the assumptions made. All discussion is use- 
less so long as there is no well-defined situa- 
tion to consider. 

So we shall concern ourselves here only 
with the best possible kind of peace; that 
peace which the French Socialist Party has 
from the first always declared for* The un- 
selfish intervention of the United States and 
the Russian Revolution allow us to count 
upon a realisation more perfect, than we for- 
merly dared to hope for of a really durable 
and just peace. So the Party has good rea- 
son to will more firmly than ever the peace 
which it has already adumbrated. 



FRENCH SOCIALIST PARTY AND AVAR AIMS S 



1. — Conditions of Peace. 

(a) Territorial Delimitations, 

The basic principle is, that nations have 
the right to dispose of their destinies. This 
right leads them in some cases to demand 
their independence — that is, to desire to 
form a separate and sovereign state; in 
others, to demand self-government inside a 
statfi of which they are only a part. The 
federal state is a compromise. 

Self-government and federation were the 
solutions envisaged by all oppressed Euro- 
pean nations before the war, because the 
more thorough solution — the creation of a 
separate state — could not be hoped for. The 
war, by opening up all kinds of possibili- 
ties, has allowed them to formulate their 
wishes more candidly. Some of them desire 
independence ; others would be satisfied with 
self-government. We do not know of any 
which ask for a federation of national states. 



4 FRENCH SOCIALIST PARTY AND WAR AIMS 

Whatever may be the very various reasons 
that decide the preferences of individual na- 
tions, we consider that it is right to satisfy 
natural aspirations, and, consequently, to 
modify existing frontiers everyr^^here and 
to such a degree as may be needed to make 
states and nations as co-extensive as is prac- 
ticable. 

This implies both the creation of new 
states — such as Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, 
Armenia perhaps, — and the extension of ex- 
isting states, — for example, Roumania, Italy 
and Serbia. It implies also the creation of 
an international guarantee to protect the 
small nations which are satisfied with self- 
government. 

One may always regard the wishes of na- 
tions on the question of independence or self- 
government as being a matter of general 
knowledge, so that there is no difficulty about 
making any nation a state. The whole diffi- 
culty lies in fixing the frontiers for each na- 
tionality, since there is always a fringe — in 
some cases a wide one — wherein populations 
are mixed and of uncertain origin. The 
idea naturally suggests itself of consulting 



FRENCH SOCIALIST PARTY AND WAR AIMS 5 

the population by means of a referendum. 
This, however, would be a bad course to take 
in Eastern Europe, even in times of peace, 
and quite a ridiculous one after the war, 
since death and deportation will have re- 
duced, in varying proportion, all mixed pop- 
ulations. It will therefore be necessary to 
examine what methods can be used to ensure 
a proper impartiality and arrive at equit- 
able delimitations of territory. We cannot 
do more here than draw attention to this 
important question of finding a correct pro- 
cedure. 

So far as the German people is concerned, 
its wish to be united in a sovereign state 
must obviously be respected, and this raises 
the question of bringing together the Ger- 
mans in Austria and Germany. As their 
desire to form a new political unit would de- 
pend primarily on the constitutional form 
to be adopted, it appears that the best pro- 
cedure would in this case be the assembling 
of some kind of elective Parliament in which 
all had representation. 

Finally, there are two special cases to 
which the ordinary rules cannot be applied. 



6 FRENCH SOCIALIST PARTY AND WAR AIMS 

The Jews, owing to their being so scattered, 
can only demand civic equality with the na- 
tionals of the country in which they live; 
and this must be assured to them. The cre- 
ation of a separate Jewish state, however, 
can also be kept in mind. 

Alsace-Lorraine affords the only example 
of a national question which has become a 
matter of legal decision. Here it is not a 
case of a nationality demanding recognition, 
or of delimitation of territory. At the elec- 
tions of 1871 and 1874, held under the con- 
trol of the German authorities, Alsace-Lor- 
raine made a unanimous protest against her 
annexation by Germany. So to return her 
to France would be merely a righteous resti- 
tution. 

(b) Colonies and Protectorates. 

So far we have been concerned only with 
nations that have reached a certain stage of 
culture, political maturity and economic de- 
velopment which entitles them to become 
sovereign states. 

But not all the peoples of the world have 



FRENCH SOCIALIST PARTY AND WAR AIMS 7 

got SO far. Unhappily, international con- 
gresses have given no indication as to the 
course to be taken with regard to what may 
be called the non-adult peoples. They only 
warn us against "capitalist colonial policy." 
But we know well enough that capitalism, 
whatever may be the method adopted for 
joining or not joining these peoples to the 
European States, will always have freer 
scope among them than elsewhere. The 
problem is to find a means of ensuring that 
this capitalist colonial policy shall be con- 
trolled in the most effective manner possible ; 
and of guaranteeing the fullest possible self- 
government to colonies and protectorates 
when they have developed sufficiently. 

We do not think that colonial and protec- 
torate countries can be left to themselves, 
and, as for distributing colonies, we do not 
know what principles to adopt for our guid- 
ance. We willingly assent to the proposal 
that her colonies should be restored to Ger- 
many. 

We hope that the Socialist parties will 
make a particular point of giving close at- 
tention to colonial questions. 



8 FRENCH SOCIALIST PARTY AND WAR AIMS 

(c) War Indemnities ; Restitution. 

The principle of war indemnities properly 
so called being paid by States guilty of ag 
gression is not in any way objectionable. 
But we are willing to waive it, since its en- 
forcement would reduce Germany to so com- 
plete financial slavery that her economic life 
would be paralysed. Yet the making good 
of damage done must be thrown entirely on 
the shoulders of the aggressive States. 

Which States are they 1 We consider that 
on the morrow of the war we shall have to 
regard as such the new confederated Ger- 
many, Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey, ex- 
cluding territories detached from these coun- 
tries. 

What will constitute damage? All the 
material damage due to military operations, 
devastation and pillage in the countries in- 
vaded. 

In what way will reparation be made ? 

Payments in cash can be considered only 
so far as a relatively small part of the total 
damage is concerned. It will therefore be 



FRENCH SOCIALIST PARTY AND WAR AIMS 9 

necessary to exact a large part of the in- 
demnity in kind, that is, in work, a directer 
form than money. This dictum may per- 
haps seem to come strangely from Social- 
ists ; but we shall have to insist that a part 
of Germany's labour shall be consecrated, 
for a term of years, to making good the de- 
struction wrought by Germany. 

How could we do otherwise? Belgium 
will not be able to devote herself again to 
productive work for a long time to come. 
Meanwhile, whom can we ask to restore her 
unless it be the people which ravaged her ? 



10 FRENCH SOCIALIST PARTY AND WAR AIMS 



2. — Fundamental Principles of Interna- 
tional Relations. 

What is signified by the term Society of 
Nations, — the establishment of a judicial 
regulation of the relationships of States, — 
is the supreme aim of this war, which has 
brought to the front the question of Interna- 
tional Law and relations. 

But in order that the Society of Nations 
may be a reality, not merely a sham or a 
label attached to a little-altered world, it is 
essential that there should be nations, and 
that lawful national claims should practi- 
cally all have been settled in advance. Then 
only, when the stability of international life 
has thus been considerably increased, will 
the Society of Nations be able to establish 
itself and increase this security by progres- 
sive stages. 

It seems to us unprofitable to examine all 
the forms of the international order that 
must be created. We are well disposed to- 



FRENCH SOCIALIST PilHTY AND WAR AIMS 11 

wards all forms that will tend to make it a 
permanent part of international life and 
give the standing international tribunal 
power to inflict adequate penalties on States 
that do not bow to its decisions. Disarma- 
ment would be a natural consequence of this 
new order of things. The tribunal could be 
made the guardian of treaties, which would 
be valid only by virtue of the publicity given 
them by the tribunal. 

Since the peace treaty must bring into 
being new States having no outlet to the sea, 
the question of international routes will as- 
sume a new importance. Special regulations 
dealing with this matter will have to be in- 
cluded in the terms of the treaty; and the 
sphere of the tribunal must be enlarged by 
degrees to enable it to deal with questions of 
this kind. 



12 FRENCH SOCIALIST PARTY AND WAR AIMS 



3. — ^Means of Attaining These Aims in 
Practice. 

The peace treaty, if signed with reason- 
able promptitude, will lay down the rules for 
solving many problems before it will be able 
to find definite solutions. The new or al- 
tered States will not be organised all at once. 
So there must be a more or less extended pe- 
riod, certainly one of sufficient length, be- 
tween the cessation of hostilities and the 
signing of the final peace treaty. The first 
treaty, then, will not be able to establish the 
Society of Nations ; but it must nevertheless 
provide for it and lay down its principles. 

A list of all the Commissions of Enquiry 
that would have to be appointed to find solu- 
tions of all the problems of the coining peace, 
would fill several extra pages. 



FRENCH SOCIALIST PARTY AND WAR AIMS 13 



4. — The Part to Be Played by the Inter- 
nationale AND Democracy. 

(A) The Collciboration of Neutrals in the 

Making of Peace. 

We do not think that this would be of any 
value. Peace will render possible the So- 
ciety of Nations, which alone will be in a po- 
sition to sign a definite treaty, to which neu- 
trals might be invited to subscribe. 

(B) The Direct Collaboration of Parlia- 

ments, 

A treaty is discussed by diplomats, profes- 
sional or otherwise, and no other course is 
possible. But diplomats are given instruc- 
tions and it is essential that these should be 
communicated to the Parliaments, or at least 
to Committees for foreign affairs, so that 
they may be criticised and, if need be, be 
challenged in secret session. 



14) FRENCH SOCIALIST PARTY AND WAR AIMS 



(C) The Collaboration of Socialist 
Parties 

The Socialist parties should devote most 
of their energy to considering the peace 
terms, in the spirit outlined in the early 
paragraphs of this Reply ; and it is the duty 
of the Socialist members of the Commission 
for Foreign Affairs to make the Party's 
ideas carry the day. Moreover, the Socialist 
parties must set active propaganda on foot 
in every country in favour of a peace such 
as we set forth here. 

(D) Steps to Be Taken by the 
Internationale. 

If the Internationale be agreed as to peace 
aims, the various sections will naturally have 
to combine so as to make their influence felt 
as fully as possible when negotiations are in 
progress. 



FRENCH SOCIALIST PARTY AND WAR AIMS 15 



5. — General Socialist Conference. 

Are we prepared to take part in a general 
conference — 

(1) WitJiout conditions? 

No ! First, because we think that the ques- 
tion of responsibility for the war and the re- 
sponsibility of the German Social-Demo- 
cratic Party must head the Orders of the 
Day at the first meeting of the Internation- 
ale. This would only be in conformity with 
the decision arrived at in the Copenhagen 
Congress as to the application of resolutions 
passed by international congresses. 

Now, although the question of responsibil- 
ity underlies all our views about the war 
and peace, it has not at the moment a first 
place in our minds ; so that, when the Inter- 
nationale meets and finds itself, as usual, 
with insufficient time for its business, it 
would quickly pass to matters which are of 



16 FRENCH SOCIALIST PARTY AND WAR AIMS 

greater interest to-day. We maintain that 
the Internationale, when called upon to pass 
sentence and decree the necessary exclu- 
sions, should be able, b}^ that alone, to show 
itself capable of setting its house in order. 
We therefore shall never consent to the de- 
bate being held imder unfavourable condi- 
tions. 

Secondly, even if we waived the question 
of responsibility, we could not agree uncon- 
ditionally to take part in a general confer- 
ence. We refused to go to Stockholm, when 
invited by the Dutch Section, because we 
would not be mixed up with a business the 
originating of which was very reasonably 
suspected as being the work of the Imperial 
Chancellery. The proposal made by our 
Russian comrades is only that of our Dutch 
comrades in another form. The new con- 
ference is compromised in just the same way 
as its predecessor; and the members of the 
Soviet, caught in the toils of German in- 
trigue — fresh proofs of which come to light 
daily — ^know well enough that even among 
them certain very honest currents of opinion 
originate in German or reactionary plotting. 



FRENCH SOCIALIST PARTY AND WAR AIMS 17 

But our chief reason for refusing to go to 
Stockholm was that we were not sure 
whether the Internationale were now to be 
trusted. 

What, in fact, is the business before US'? 
To prepare the way for peace. If that means 
to suggest clearing the road for parleying, 
and consequently for a compromised peace, 
we set our faces firmly against it. 

(2) // not, on what conditions? 

We must have formal preliminary guar- 
antees on this point. All sections of the In- 
ternationale must first of all make it quite 
clear that what they wish to unite in finding 
is the terms of a completely satisfactory 
peace. 

For even in its present condition the In- 
ternationale is a force to be reckoned with. 
If it committed itself to working for a peace 
by compromise, it might well succeed, — and 
one would then be entitled to speak of the 
bankruptcy of the Internationale, as a 
whole, not merely of that of the German sec- 
tions. If, on the morrow of the war, we 



18 FRENCH SOCIALIST PARTY AND WAR AIMS 

made a precarious peace for which the In- 
ternationale were partly responsible, the lat- 
ter would be the laughing-stock of the masses 
all the world over, and for a long time to 
come the extension of Socialism would be im- 
possible. And it would richly deserve its 
fate. 

We will be no party to so suicidal a pro- 
ceeding. 

But if it be a matter of laying down the 
principles of a righteous and durable peace, 
then the course is clear, and we know where 
we are. So we hope to reach an agreement 
which we will make known to the world, and 
which would enable us to put effective pres- 
sure on the Governments if, in the face of 
their declarations, they still evinced any 
longings for imperialism. 



FRENCH SOCIALIST PARTY AND WAR AIMS 19 



The Question of Responsibility. 

When the Internationale holds session, 
united by first expressing its desire to con- 
centrate on making the Society of Nations a 
reality by giving freedom to the peoples, 
the question of responsibility should be the 
first thing discussed. This might prove a 
really useful step. 

Responsibility for the war would be dealt 
with first ; and it is obvious enough where it 
lies, even if the actual declaration of war 
be left out of account. The wording of the 
ultimatum to Serbia and the rejection of the 
Serbian reply afford sufficient evidence. So 
do the refusals given to all proposals to de- 
lay a decision, to refer to the Hague, to 
mediate, to hold diplomatic conversations. 
So does the invasion of Luxemburg and Bel- 
gium. There is evidence enough and to 
spare. 

Indirect and general responsibility also is 
spoken of ; and, indeed, it too must be looked 



20 FRENCH SOCIALIST PAKTY AND WAS, AIMS 

into. But wherever it may lie, even if it 
were shared in many quarters, we must hold 
that it in no way lessens the direct responsi- 
bility resulting from individual wills acting 
in concert. 

We must not take refuge in vague and 
cheap catch-words and say that on capital- 
ism rests most of the blame for the present 
war. It would be a mis-statement, since 
megalomania is not specially capitalist, and 
has been indulged in under all possible eco- 
nomic conditions. The arch-culprit is Pan- 
Germanism. Of course, capitalism had 
brought about certain conditions favourable 
to developing the idea of hegemony, but this 
has happened in the past under various 
regimes : and of course the period which wit- 
nessed the Prussian bid for power has given 
it a distinct character. None the less, the 
will to power is the primary cause of the 
war, a cause which is nowise capitalistic in 
its essence. 

The German Socialist Party, itself un- 
consciously affected by the pervading Pan- 
Germanism, had made its ideas fit in with 
the latter, though it retained the socialistic 



FRENCH SOCIAI.IST PARTY AND WAH AIMS 21 

formulas; and so diverted our attention 
from the danger which it should have de- 
noimced. 

The Socialist group in the Reichstag had 
no excuse for passing the vote of credit on 
August 4, 1914. The Vortvdrts had ascer- 
tained which party desired war. It had ut- 
tered warnings against the cunning of cer- 
tain groups which were pulling the strings 
and proclaiming the struggle to be one 
against Czarism, with an eye to making the 
war popular. It had jmt people on their 
gTiard against false reports, notably that of 
the aeroplane attack on Nuremberg. More- 
over, the German deputies would incrimi- 
nate themselves by setting up as defence that 
they had been misled, since their confidence 
in the Imperial Government is the very thing 
which we are entitled to reproach them with. 
Finally, they listened to the announcement 
of the invasion of Belgium and to the con- 
fession that the deed was quite unjustifiable 
without making a sign, and by their vote 
associated themselves with the Empire's 
crime. 

It is therefore useless to investigate the 



22 FRENCH SOCIALIST PARTY AND WAR AIMS 

subsequent attitude of the German Socialist 
Party, since it lias been such as would follow 
logically from the vote of the Fourth of 
August. 

A Minority Party eventually was formed. 
But the separation came very late in the day, 
and we cannot forget that the members of 
the new party had already voted, and that 
publicly, with those of the old. We are im- 
able to express full approval of the new 
party's acts and tenets; though we realise 
that it is at least hostile to the Imperial Gov- 
ernment. 

It is impossible to regard the old party 
as a Socialist Party, and we could not re- 
main members of an Internationale which 
did not decree its exclusion. 

In this case it is not simply a matter of 
excluding a few individuals who have com- 
promised themselves personally by their re- 
lations with the chancellery. What must 
be banished from the Internationale is the 
whole of the old German Socialist Party, 
now infected by Pan-Germanism. We hope, 
also, that the new *' Independent Labour 
Party" will strengthen itself by adopting a 



FRENCH SOCIALIST PARTY AND WAR AIMS 23 

more reasonable view of things, and Avill 
soon receive many new adherents from 
among those German workmen who shall 
have come to their senses. 



24 FRENCH SOCIALIST PARTY AND WAR AIMS 



Conclusion. 

If we had in advance the assurance that 
the Internationale, in neutral and allied 
countries at least, contained a large major- 
ity favourable to the plan which is here sug- 
gested, we should most gladly proceed to dis- 
cuss with it the details of that plan. 

Perhaps it may seem to be asking too 
much to stand aloof from a discussion un- 
less agreement be first guaranteed. But in 
this case it is not a question of voting on 
some resolution regarding doctrine. The 
step to be taken is one which will have the 
most serious results conceivable on the fu- 
ture of our party, of the Internationale and 
of France, whose interests, all bound up to- 
gether, we will not stake on the chances of a 
doubtful majority. 

It will be said that our conditions render 
impossible the projected summoning of the 
Internationale. 

That is quite probable and, should it prove 



FRENCH SOCIALIST PARTY AND WAR AIMS 25 



to be the case, it would show that for the 
time being the Internationale cannot be re- 
lied on. It would therefore be better to 
spare it an exhibition of its present weak- 
ness, and to call a meeting only when it has 
rehabilitated itself as the result of a right- 
eous and durable peace. 

But a peace of that kind will be attained 
only by victory. Even if the sections of the 
Internationale in allied and neutral coun- 
tries were of one mind, they could not make 
peace result from their good intentions. 
That is why we lay down one more condition 
in regard to the projected congress, — one ad- 
dressed to Russian comrades: *'It is high 
time that you end your truce, if you mean to 
save the Revolution which you are imperil- 
ling, and to win a peace which will give in- 
ternational security." 



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